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GREATER UNIFORMITY AND CENTRALIZATION:  
THE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 
 OF CHINESE FOOD AND PRODUCT SAFETY  
UNDER THE WTO 
Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang 
Abstract: The WTO Agreements emphasize free trade, which links with diversity, 
deregulation, and decentralization. China, on the other hand, emphasizes uniformity and 
centralization, especially regarding the political control and the one-party system of 
“democratic dictatorship.” China’s joining the WTO, therefore, may be considered as a 
development that changes the regulatory structure to become more diverse, deregulated, 
and decentralized. This paper, however, finds the opposite. Under the WTO law, China is 
encouraged to move towards greater uniformity and centralization with its decentralized 
and non-uniform settings under the market policy. Moreover, the WTO’s uniform and 
centralized encouragements can be integrated into the rule-by-man framework to increase 
the administrative and economic power of the Party. It is thus unclear whether China’s 
food and product safety problem can be solved.  
Cite as: Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang, Greater Uniformity and Centralization: The Regulatory 
Development of Chinese Food and Product Safety Under the WTO, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 
65 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) promotes free trade, which is 
often considered as enhancing diversity, deregulation, and decentralization. 
China, on the other hand, emphasizes the one-party system embracing 
uniformity and centralization, particularly with regards to political control 
over words, thoughts, and action, as well as economic control under 
communist-capitalist, or bureaucratic-capitalist, policies. 1  When China 
became a WTO member in 2001, it appeared to be part of a liberalization 
process that would lead the country to be more diverse, deregulated, and 
decentralized. This paper, however, finds the opposite, particularly 
concerning the Chinese government administration’s role in the food and 
product safety system.  
                                                 
  S.J.D. (Doctor of Juridical Science), LL.M., American University Washington College of Law; 
LL.M. with Distinction, City University of Hong Kong; LL.B., University of London; M.B.A., University of 
Leicester; B.A., The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Tang is a registered attorney in the State of New 
York. I am deeply indebted to Professors Padideh Ala’i and Jeffrey S. Lubbers at American University 
Washington College of Law for their insightful comments. All errors are mine. E-mail address: 
christynktang@gmail.com. 
1  Maurice Meisner, THE DENG XIAOPING ERA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FATE OF CHINESE 
SOCIALISM,1978–94 passim (1996). 
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In light of the one-party system of political uniformity and 
centralization, Communist China has ironically relied on a flexible and 
decentralized market policy to pursue economic growth.2 In the context of 
food and product safety, this flexibility and decentralization presents in 
different forms in terms of standardization, administrative, and legal measures, 
which mainly rely on ex post remedies of private law. This governance 
structure can also be viewed as a self-regulated laissez-faire system that is 
monitored by nearly three thousand local governments at the county levels 
through rulemakers, regulators, and economic developers that are closely 
connected with the industry in various regions.3 
By contrast, as a WTO Member, China is encouraged—or obliged—to 
develop a regulatory system that is more uniform and centralized. Uniformity 
arises in two facets. One direction is the transparency principle that requires a 
“uniform, impartial and reasonable” application of rules under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 4  and “uniform administration” 
under the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (China 
Protocol).5 These uniformities, however, can be based on unwritten concepts, 
such as reasonableness and fairness, as well as written definitions regarding 
administrative action.  
Another uniformity direction concerns the international harmonization 
of safety standards. These standards provide written substantive rules that are 
closely related to scientific evidence directed and supported by recognized 
experts and authorities.6 Both uniformity directions under transparency and 
harmonization require centralized settings, which rely on the central roles of 
the WTO’s dispute mechanism and designated organizations at the 
international level, as well as the central government at the national level to 
ensure conformity.       
                                                 
2 Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang, China v. China: The Paradox in Regulating Food and Product Safety 211–
306 (May 9, 2014) (S.J.D. dissertation, American University) (on file with Pence Library, American 
University), available at: https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/thesesdissertations:336 [hereinafter 
Tang, China v. China]. 
3 Id. 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 
1994]. 
5 Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Nov. 10, 2001, WT/L/432 [hereinafter China Protocol]. 
6 Sam F. Halabi, The Codex Alimentarius Commission, Corporate Influence, and International Trade: 
A Perspective on FDA’s Global Role, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 406, 417 (2015) [hereinafter Halabi]; THE ROLE 
OF ‘EXPERTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN DECISION MAKING PROCESSES: ADVISORS, DECISION 
MAKERS OR IRRELEVANT ACTORS? 194 (Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2014). 
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The WTO’s uniformity and centralization goals seem to stem from the 
Western rule of law tradition to pursue certainty, consistency, and 
predictability. Considering the function of WTO law, uniformity in the forms 
of harmonization and transparency can be a means to eliminate unnecessary 
trade barriers, as well as arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, with the 
goal to promote free trade that encourages equality and fairness. When this 
view of equality, or non-discrimination, combines with the preventive 
approach that enhances the role of governments to protect people from 
harmful food and products, national administrations can be encouraged, or 
obliged, to regulate, direct, or supervise economic activities. 
In China, this safety and free trade development regarding uniformity 
and centralization may strengthen the economic role of the central 
government. Besides the political control, the Communist Party can be 
encouraged, or obliged, to have regulatory and economic power centralized 
and uniform when supervising food and merchandise production. Without a 
rule of law, the Chinese food and product safety development can ironically 
be a domestic deliberalization process under the WTO’s international 
liberalization. Moreover, it is unclear if the safety problems can be solved. 
This paper aims to examine the impact of the WTO’s pursuit of uniform 
and centralized regulations on China. The study is divided into five sections. 
After this introductory section, the second section reviews the WTO’s 
uniformity and centralization provisions under the principles of transparency 
and harmonization.7 The third section examines how the Chinese food and 
product safety regulatory system rely on flexibility, decentralization, and self-
regulation. The fourth section discusses Chinese developments in uniformity 
and centralization that embrace greater administrative, information, and 
economic control by the central government. The fifth section concludes that 
the international free trade development under WTO law can be used to 
strengthen the “full process control” of the Party in China. 
II. THE WTO’S CENTRALIZED UNIFORMITY  
The WTO Agreements—generally referred to as the Final Act—are a 
                                                 
7  As discussed in Part I, Section C and D, the “encouragements” under the SPS and TBT Agreements 
may refer to voluntary standards that can be transformed to be mandatory obligations in practice. Thus, the 
word of “encouragement” might only be half-accurate. The use of this word “encouragements” follows the 
WTO’s official website such as Understanding the WTO Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, WTO (May 1998), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm. 
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series of rules that were agreed to at resulting the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations.8 These agreements are legal texts that spell 
out the principles of liberalization.9 The aim, as provided by the WTO, is to 
combat discrimination and unnecessary obstacles to trade, as well as to create 
a predictable trading environment.10 Applying this framework to international 
food and product safety, however, can actually lead to greater uniformity and 
centralization of deliberalization.11  
These uniform and centralized characteristics are presented in various 
forms. This section, in particular, focuses on four WTO Agreements. First, 
the GATT, which provides the fundamental principles regarding “uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner.”12 Second, the China Protocol, which lays 
down specific obligations requiring “uniform administration.”13 Third and 
fourth are the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) 
and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement), which both concern substantive safety standards. 
A. GATT’s “Uniform, Impartial and Reasonable Manner” of Rule 
Application 
WTO law requires uniform application of trade measures, which 
mainly concerns administrative action regarding how government officials 
should apply substantive rule. In particular, under the transparency principle, 
Article X:3(a) of the GATT states that “each contracting party shall administer 
in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, 
decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.”14  
                                                 
8  WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ 
final_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); WTO, Overview: A Navigational Guide, WTO, [hereinafter WTO, 
A Navigational Guide], https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
28, 2018).  
9  WTO, A Navigational Guide, supra note 8.  
10  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, [hereinafter TBT], 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.  
11  Robert L. Howse et al., Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seal 
Products, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 81, 135 (2015) [hereinafter Pluralism in Practice]; Halabi, supra 
note 6, at 407. Uniformity may refer to the application of trade measures under the transparency principle 
and the encouragement of domestic measures to be based on international standards under harmonization. 
Centralization functions as a means to unify such applications and standards through the central government 
at the national level and the WTO at the international level. 
12  GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X:3(a). 
13  China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I § 2(A). 
14  GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X:3(a). 
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Paragraph 1, Article X:1 of the GATT, provides details regarding the 
scope of those trade measures that shall be applied in a “uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner,” which include: 
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings 
of general application, made effective by any contracting party, 
pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products of 
customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or 
to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports 
or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, 
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, 
exhibition, processing, mixing or other use . . . [as well as] 
[a]greements affecting international trade policy which are in 
force between the government or a governmental agency of any 
contracting party and the government or governmental agency of 
any other contracting party . . . .15 
 
Such trade measures include: (1) statutes written by the legislature, (2) 
regulations written by agencies, (3) judicial decisions written by judges, and 
(4) administrative rulings written by administrative courts regarding customs, 
imports and exports, and transfer of payments, as well as (5) any policies 
determined by executive functions that may affect movement of goods. Thus, 
both legal rules and policies in the forms of trade or domestic measures that 
directly or indirectly affect international trade shall be applied in a “uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner.” 
 Although the scope of trade measures is broad, Article X only focuses 
on their publication and application, not the substantive content of rules 
regarding trade conduct.16 In other words, there are two types of rules—one 
providing substantive rules regulating the activities of traders, the other 
providing procedural or administrative rules regulating the activities of 
agencies.  
To determine whether a rule is administrative, the panel in Argentina – 
Hides and Leather considered that administrative rules merely provide for a 
                                                 
15  GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X:1 (emphasis added). 
16  WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GATT 1994 – ARTICLE X (JURISPRUDENCE) 16 [hereinafter WTO, 
ANALYTICAL INDEX (ART. X)], https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/ 
gatt1994_art10_jur.pdf (the Appellate Body in EC – Poultry explicitly stated that the substantive content of 
the rules themselves falls outside the scope).  
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means, or a certain manner, for assisting officials to apply and enforce 
substantive rules.17 In line with this principle, the panel in US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review provided that the United States’ sunset review 
laws, which contain different reviewing requirements from the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, refer to the substance rather than their administration.18 Thus, the 
measures in question are outside the scope of Article X:3(a) of the GATT.19 
However, if substantive content regulates the administration, application, or 
implementation of a legal instrument, it is within the scope and must be 
uniform, impartial, and reasonable.20 
In accordance with the Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs 
Matters, “uniform administration” refers to the “general application” of laws 
that have a “significant impact on overall administration,” 21  but not the 
“administrative process” for a series of steps or the impact on a single case.22 
The uniformity of rule application, therefore, can be referring to those rules 
regarding administrative “definition, guidelines or standards.”23 
These written rules regarding general application in the forms of 
definition, guidelines or standards, however, may be applied differently based 
on unwritten concepts, impartiality, and reasonableness, in accordance with 
particular circumstances. For instance, in order to pursue nondiscriminatory 
and equal treatment, the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Korea) emphasized 
“uniformity of treatment” of traders and provided that “uniform 
                                                 
17  Id. at 16. In this case, the measure in question does not create the classification requirements, provide 
for export refunds, or impose export duties, therefore, is not covered by Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. 
18  In US – Corrison-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, Japan argued that the evidentiary requirements for 
self-intiation under the US’ sunset review laws were “administrative in nature.” Moreover, the U.S. 
application of its sunset reviews was not uniform because it has different approach from Article 11.3 of Anti-
dumping Agreement (AD) sunset reviews. The panel, however, ruled that the sunset reviews under Article 
11.3 of AD “is not subject to the evidentiary requirements” as the United States’ sunset reviews. Thus, the 
difference between AD’s and United States’ sunset reviews “is related to the substance rather than the 
administration . . . .” Id. at 17. 
19  Id.  
20  Id.  
21  Id. at 17–18 (the Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs Matters provided that Article X:3(a) of 
the GATT 1994 does not require uniform “administrative process” that “may be understood as a series of 
steps, actions, or events that are taken or occur in relation to the making of an administrative decision . . . .”).  
22  “Administration” emphasizes “significant impact on the overall administration . . . and not simply 
on the outcome of the single case in question.” Id. at 17. The Appellate Body in EC –  Selected Customs 
Matters defined “application” as “putting into practical effect, or applying, a legal instrument.” Id. at 21. 
23  Id. In line with this view, the panel in China – Raw Materials found that a foreign trade system that 
allocates export quotas operated by thirty-two local departments without any guidelines or standards 
constituted non-uniform administration. In this case, the panel considered that “there is a very real risk” that 
similar exporters may be treated differently by thirty-two dispersed local offices. Id. 
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administration” of laws and regulations “must be understood to mean 
uniformity of treatment in respect of persons similarly situated,” and not to 
require “identical results where relevant facts differ.”24  
Uniform administration also aims to ensure due process, which pertains 
to different subject matters and can be interpreted differently based on actual 
circumstances.25  For instance, in EC – Selected Customs Matters, due process 
refered to the ability of a trader to have an adverse administrative decision 
reviewed.26 To the panel in this case, the due process objective suggested 
“prompt review and correction” in a “quick and effective manner and without 
delay.”27 The meaning of “quick” or “performed without delay,” nevertheless, 
“depends on the context and particular circumstances” and “the nature of the 
specific administrative action,” and “thus cannot be determined in the 
abstract.”28  
Consequently, the true extent of GATT’s uniformity is not well-defined 
and can be of unwritten nature.29 Whether an application of trade measures or 
administrative rules is “uniform, impartial and reasonable” depends on the 
interpretation of the WTO’s dispute mechanism. The WTO, therefore, has the 
centralized power to determine and unify the manner of rule application 
regarding domestic trade measures of its Members.  
 In addition, the GATT expects Members’ central governments to 
ensure national uniformity. Article X(3)(b) of the GATT, which concerns 
publication and administration of trade measures, requires Members to 
establish independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals for 
reviewing and correcting administration action. 30  Thus, the central 
government may ensure that trade measures are published and applied in a 
unified way. Law publication, therefore, can also be a means to uniform and 
centralized rule application at the national level.31 
                                                 
24  Id. at 20. 
25  Id. at 3.  
26  Id.  
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 16–17 
30  GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X(3)(b). 
31  Padideh Ala’i & Matthew D’Orsi, Transparency in International Economic Relations and the Role 
of the WTO, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSPARENCY 368, 369 (Padideh Ala’i & Robert Vaughn eds., 
2014). 
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B. China’s Uniform and Centralized Obligations 
The China Protocol requires uniformity and centralization beyond the 
GATT. In addition to including a rule application manner and a review 
mechanism, Part I, Section 2(A) emphasizes “uniform administration” 
regarding (1) the entire customs territory of China, and (2) the compliance of 
local rules.32 These obligations involve a governing framework covering not 
only administrative rules but also substantive trade measures. Moreover, the 
central government shall ensure this framework through its judiciary that is 
under the executive function in practice.33   
Section 2(A)(1) of the China Protocol provides, “the provisions of the 
WTO Agreement and this Protocol shall apply to the entire customs territory 
of China.”34 This territory includes “special economic areas” such as “border 
trade regions and minority autonomous areas, Special Economic Zones, open 
coastal cities, economic and technical development zones[,] and other areas 
where special regimes for tariffs, taxes, and regulations are established.”35 As 
such, this provision requires that the substantive rules of the WTO Agreement 
to be uniformly implemented throughout the country.36   
In addition, the China Protocol specifically requires local measures to 
comply with the WTO Agreement. 37  These local rules include “local 
regulations, rules, and other measures of local governments at the sub-national 
level.”38 The international obligations under the WTO Agreement, therefore, 
are transformed into national and local obligations in terms of substance. In 
other words, the substantive trade measures in China can be expected to be 
uniform at a higher level following WTO law.39  
                                                 
32  China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, §§ 2(A)(1)–(4). 
33  Feng Lin, The Future of Judicial Independence in China 5 (City Univ. of H.K., May Working Paper 
No. 2, 2016), http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/cjer/lib/doc/paper/WK2_The_Future_of_Judicial 
Independence_in_China.pdf. The judiciary in China is not considered to be independent, because it is within 
the executive function. The Chinese review mechanism, therefore, can be a tool of the central or local 
governments to enhance political and economic supervision.   
34  China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, § 2(A)(1). 
35  Id.  
36  Jeffrey L. Gertler, What China’s WTO Accession Is All About, in CHINA AND THE WTO: ACCESSION, 
POLICY REFORM, AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 27–28 (Deepak Bhattasali et al. eds., 2004). 
37  China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, § 2(A)(3). This provision states, “China’s local regulations, rules 
and other measures of local governments at the sub-national level shall conform to the obligations undertaken 
in the WTO Agreement and this Protocol.” 
38  Id. 
39  Jerome Cohen, China’s Troubled Path to WTO, 20 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001). 
 
January 2019 Greater Uniformity and Centralization   73 
 
 
Besides substantive rules affecting traders, similar to the GATT, Part I, 
Section 2(A)(2) of the China Protocol requires uniform rule application by 
Chinese officials:40 
China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures of 
the central government as well as local regulations, rules and 
other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level . . . 
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights (“TRIPS”) or the control of 
foreign exchange.41  
 
If this provision is interpreted in accordance with Article X of the GATT, 
Chinese administrative conduct shall be “uniform, impartial and reasonable.” 
This uniform obligation may be satisfied by written administrative definition, 
guidelines, or standards provided by the central government.42 Moreover, the 
unwritten abstract elements, impartiality, and reasonableness can be based on 
the interpretation of central authorities, as well as the interpretation of WTO 
law.43 As such, both substantive trade measures and their applications can be 
centralized to a more significant level in Beijing and at the WTO. 
Greater uniformity and centralization may also be enhanced by 
transparency as a means to ensure conformity. For instance, the transparency 
principle requires that China’s trade measures be shared with the WTO as an 
information center for other Members at the international level, and that they 
are published by an official journal with an enquiry point established by the 
central government at the national level.44 These transparency requirements  
serve a supporting role as secondary rules to ensure that external parties, such 
as “any individual, enterprise or WTO Member,” can access  substantive 
measures as primary rules at the center to establish greater uniformity.45  
Similar to the GATT, this greater uniformity and centralization can be 
strengthened by the national review obligation. Part I, Section 2(A)(4) of the 
                                                 
40  China Protocol, supra note, 5, pt. I, § 2(A). 
41  Id. pt. I, § 2(A)(2). 
42  WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX (ART. X), supra note 16, at 10–11. 
43  The terms “impartial” and “reasonable” are unwritten abstract concepts because their meanings can 
be changed in accordance with different facts and actual circumstances. 
44  China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, §§ 2(B)(1), 2(C)(2)–(3). 
45  Id. pt. I, § 2(C). 
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China Protocol requires the country to “establish a mechanism under which 
individuals and enterprises can bring to the attention of the national authorities 
cases of non-uniform application of the trade regime.”46 This mechanism, 
moreover, relies on “tribunals . . . for the prompt review of all administrative 
actions.”47 As such, under the Protocol, China’s trade measures and their 
applications are expected to be examined independently to ensure 
conformity.48 
These national review settings can also be considered as secondary 
rules as a means to ensure the compliance with trade measures as primary 
rules. Rather than being substantive rules to provide what officials or traders 
shall or shall not do, these secondary rules provide a means, in the form of 
independent review mechanisms, for external checks and balances to ensure 
uniformity of administrative conduct and treatment. However, since China 
does not have separation of powers under its democratic dictatorship, the 
Chinese judiciary is still, in reality, within the executive function. 49  The 
Chinese administrative and judicial review mechanisms, therefore, may not 
be as independent or as impartial and reasonable as expected.50  
C. Greater Uniformity and Centralization Under the TBT 
Agreement 
The TBT Agreement was established in 1979. 51  Considering 
international standards and systems can improve the efficiency of production, 
facilitate international trade, and transfer technology, the Agreement 
encourages greater uniformity.52 Such uniformity, moreover, shall be based 
                                                 
46  Id. at pt. I, § 2(A)(4). 
47  Id. at pt. I, § 2(D)(1). 
48  More details regarding how the Chinese review mechanism will be discussed in Part III can be found 
at Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang, The WTO’s Impact on China: A Battle of Administrative Review Settings between 
Internal and External Regulatory Frameworks, 10 VIENNA J. INT’L. CONST. L. 251, 265–70 (2016) 
[hereinafter Tang, The WTO’s Impact on China]. 
49  Id.  
50  Id. at 265. 
51  TBT, supra note 10, annex A(2). 
52  Id., pmbl.; Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO [hereinafter WTO, 
Technical Information], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 
2018); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 153 (Tracy Epps & 
Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 373, 392 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005). 
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on science that may be centralized by recognized experts and institutions.53 
This regulatory process is promoted as harmonization. 
 The TBT Agreement focuses on three subject matters: (1) technical 
standards, (2) technical regulations, and (3) conformity assessment systems.54 
Standards are defined as voluntary while regulations are mandatory. 55 
Regulations and standards are “technical” when the rules “set out specific 
characteristics of a product—such as its size, shape, design, functions and 
performance, or the way it is labeled or packaged before it is put on sale.”56 
In certain circumstances, the meaning of “technical” may extend to cover “the 
way a product is produced” such as “a product’s process and production 
methods” (PPMs) that affect products’ characteristics.57 As such, technical 
standards and regulations can be considered as primary substantive rules 
regarding producers’ conduct in the form of what technical products should 
or shall be. Moreover, these rules may govern not only producers within the 
territories of regulating Members, but also the conduct of foreign exporting 
producers outside their territories.58 
In contrast, rather than producer action, “conformity assessment 
procedures” refer to “any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine 
that relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled.”59 
These rules, then, focus on administrative conduct and regulatory settings of 
                                                 
53  TBT, supra note 10, pmbl.; Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade,  WTO 
[hereinafter WTO, Technical Information], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2018); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 153 
(Tracy Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 373 & 392 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005). 
54  TBT, supra note 10, art. 1.6. 
55  Id., annex 1, ¶¶ 1–2; WTO, Technical Information, supra note 53. 
56  TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, ¶¶ 1–2; WTO, Technical Information, supra note 53. 
57  TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, ¶¶ 1–2; WTO, Technical Information, supra note 53; CHRISTINE R. 
CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS) IN WTO LAW: INTERFACTING TRADE AND SOCIAL 
GOALS 381 (2011).  
58  When certain PPMs (product’s process and production methods) are required under an importing 
countries’ regulations, these rules require how and what foreign producers shall do during the production 
process in exporting countries. An example is the WTO Shrimp – Turtle case, Section 609 of U.S. Public 
Law 101–102 requires shrimp to be harvested using certain technology to protect sea turtles. This rule 
governs the conduct of shrimp harvesters in India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand who export their shrimp 
products to the United States. In other words, although the shrimp harvest activities are not conducted within 
U.S. territory, those activities can be governed by U.S. law, as long as their products are exported to the 
United States. India etc versus US: ‘shrimp-turtle’, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (summarizing the 
case). 
59  TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, 3. 
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governments, non-governmental bodies, and assessment organizations. 60 
Moreover, these administrative and procedural rules can be viewed as 
secondary rules as a means to ensure the conformity of primary rules 
regarding implementation.61  
Under the Preamble of the TBT Agreement, Members have a right to 
take measures necessary at the level they consider appropriate to ensure export 
quality; to protect life, health, and the environment; and to prevent deception, 
as long as such measures do not create unnecessary obstacles in international 
trade and are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.62  
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, however, also states, “[w]here 
technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them . . . as a basis for their 
[domestic] technical regulations.”63 In EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body 
considered the meaning of “as a basis for” which may require “a very strong 
and very close relationship” between national regulations and international 
standards.64 As such, voluntary international standards are considered to have 
“automatic legal force” in the WTO that can be automatically and uniformly 
transformed to be mandatory domestic regulations, unless exceptions apply.65 
In accordance with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, exceptions 
present “when such international standards or relevant parts would be an 
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued” regarding climatic, geographic, and technical issues of 
regulating Members.66 In the view of the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines, 
                                                 
60  Id. arts. 5, 6, 7. 
61  Id. art. 5.1 
62  Id. pmbl. 
63  Id. art. 2.4 [emphasis added]. 
64  Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, Regional Trade Agreements, and World Trade Law: 
Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 137, 144–45 (2015) [hereinafter Howse, 
Regulatory Cooperation]. 
65  Robert Howse & Philip I. Levy, The TBT Panels: US – Cloves, US – Tuna, US – Cool, 12 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 327, 349–51 (2013). 
66  TBT, supra note 10, art. 2.4 (emphasis added). 
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Members must define regulating objectives.67 However, the burden of proof 
regarding when the relevant international standards would be an effective and 
appropriate means is allocated to complainants—the regulated, mainly 
exporting Members whose “trade interests are significantly affected.” 68 
Although some scholars have pointed out difficulties in practice, these 
international standards have succeeded in creating greater uniformity among 
Members’ technical regulations.69 
 Besides, international standards can be centralized in a few  “relevant  
international standardizing bodies.” 70  Under the TBT Agreement, 
“international body and system” refers to those institutions “whose 
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.”71 This can 
mainly be associated with the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC),72 as well as the 
United Nations system that provides general terms for substantive 
standardization and procedures for assessment of conformity.73  
Theoretically, the legitimacy of these international bodies is based on 
the openness of transparency, participation, and impartiality of all interested 
Members at all stages of standards development. 74  In practice, the 
international standards development process within international bodies are 
often considered to be biased and closed.75 The performance of experts in 
technical committees is also questionable considering the conflict of interest 
among their expertises, national identities, and relations with private sectors.76 
                                                 
67  See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 276–79, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted July 29, 2003); Petros C. Mavroids, Driftin’ Too Far from Shore—
Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by The WTO Appellate Body Is Wrong, 
and What Should the AB Have Done Instead, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 509, 514 (2013); Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 276–79, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 
2002). 
68  TBT, supra note 10, art. 14.4; see also Mavroids, supra note 67, at 523; Joanne Scott, International 
Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 EUR. J. 
INT’L. L. 307, 326–27 (2004); TBT, supra note 10, art. 14.4.  
69  See Mavroids, supra note 67, at 523; Scott, supra note 68, at 328. 
70  TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, ¶ 2.3(G). 
71  Id. annex 1, ¶ 4. 
72  Id. arts. 1–2. 
73  Id. art. 1.1. 
74  See Erik Wijkstorm & Devin McDaniels, Improving Regulatory Governance: International 
Standards and the WTO TBT Agreement, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 1013, 1029, 1035, 1038, 1040 (Oct. 2013); 
HUMBERTO Z. SCHRODER, HARMONIZATION, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS IN 
WTO LAW 81–82 (2011). 
75  See Wijkstorm & McDaniels, supra note 74, at 1038, 1040. 
76  See SCHRODER, supra note 74, at 78.  
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Despite these challenges, the development of international technical standards 
has been centralized at those organizations to enhance uniformity.77  
This international centralization, moreover, requires greater domestic 
centralization and uniformity as well. Article 7.5 of the TBT Agreement, in 
particular, obliges Members’ central governments to take full responsibility 
for formulating and implementing “positive measures and mechanisms” in 
supporting other regulatory bodies within their territories.78 Those positive 
measures are described as “reasonable measures” to “ensure compliance” of 
local governments and non-governmental bodies,79 such as notifying local 
governments of the TBT requirements, and not “tak[ing] measures which 
require or encourage local government bodies and non-government bodies . . . 
to act in a manner inconsistent” with the TBT provisions.80 As such, national 
centralization frameworks are established to ensure that voluntary 
international standards are implemented at the local level in the form of 
mandatory measures.81 
Centralization also comes with preemption.82 Article 4.1 of the TBT 
Agreement requires Members’ central government standardizing bodies to 
“accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards (Code of Good Practice, CGP) in 
Annex 3[,]” which states that standardizing bodies “shall make every effort to 
avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the work of other standardizing bodies 
in the national territory or with the work of relevant international or regional 
standardizing bodies.”83 In other words, if certain technical standards have 
been set by TBT’s recognized international or regional bodies, national 
standardizing bodies may not establish another set  of standards on the same 
subject matter. International standards, therefore, may restrain Members from 
                                                 
77  See Jonathan Carlone, An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After Clove, Yuna II, and Cool, 
37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103, 107 (2014); Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 64, at 144–
45; Pluralism in Practice, supra note 11, at 135. 
78  TBT, supra note 10, art. 7.5. 
79  Id. arts. 3.5, 4.1, 5.1 5.4.; see also Pluralism in Practice, supra note 11, at 135. 
80  TBT, supra note 10, art. 3.2, 3.4. 
81  See Scott, supra note 68, at 310 (suggesting governance to be premised upon coordination not 
centralization, cooperation not uniformity, shared governance not pre-emptive); Pluralism in Practice, supra 
note 11, at 135; James Bacchus, A Common Gauge: Harmonization and International Law, 37 B. C. INT’L 
7 COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014). 
82  See Henrik Horn et al., In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO 
SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 729, 730 (2013). 
83  TBT, supra note 10, art. 4.1, annex 3, ¶ (H). 
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regulating technical products.84 The regulatory power that brings economic 
power is further centralized at the international standardization bodies and 
central governments.  
In addition to the direct path above, the TBT Agreement provides 
indirect paths, such as “equivalent regulations” and “mutual recognition,” to 
harmonize technical measures among members towards greater uniformity. 
For instance, Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to “give 
positive consideration” to equivalent technical regulations of other Members, 
provided that “they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfill the 
objectives of their own regulations.”85 
Considering the “objectives” provided, Article 2.7 of the TBT 
Agreement refers to “legitimate objectives” regarding the right of Members 
to adopt “appropriate levels of protection.”86 These “legitimate objectives” 
and “appropriate levels of protection,” as stated in Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement, nevertheless, “shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary” 
and have to take account of “the risks non-fulfillment would create.”87 In 
assessing such risks, relevant elements include “available scientific and 
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products.”88  
The TBT Agreement does not provide further detail regarding what is 
“necessary.” The WTO panel in EC – Asbestos, however, observed that 
provisions of the TBT Agreement are very similar to those in Article XX of 
the GATT.89 Accordingly, in proving a measure is “necessary,” Members may 
“rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a 
divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion.”90 Moreover, with respect to 
health policy, Members do not have to follow “a majority scientific 
                                                 
84  Id. art. 13.3. 
85  Id. art. 2.7. 
86  Id. art. 2.2. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GATT 1994 – ARTICLE XX (JURISPRUDENCE) 26 [WTO, WTO 
ANALYTICAL INDEX (ART. XX)], https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/ 
gatt1994_art20_jur.pdf; see also Mavroids, supra note 67, at 515–16; GATT 1994, supra note 4, arts. XX–
XX(b). 
90  WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX (ART. XX), supra note 89, at 26. 
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opinion.”91  Whether a TBT Agreement measure is appropriate, therefore, 
depends on qualitative, instead of quantitative scientific information. 
 What does “qualitative scientific information” mean? The TBT 
Agreement states that a panel “may establish a technical expert group to assist 
in questions of a technical nature, requiring detailed consideration by 
experts.”92 Moreover, these experts are restricted to “persons of professional 
standing and experience in the field in question.”93 Thus, although equivalent 
requirements seem to accept different technical regulations, the scope of these 
measures are subject to the views of recognized experts who are often 
affiliated with international standardizing bodies that are mainly located in 
developed countries.94 
 With respect to less developed countries, the TBT Agreement requires 
Members to provide “differential and more favorable treatment” to 
developing country Members (DCMs) and to ensure that their technical 
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures “do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to exports” from those Members. 95  The TBT 
Agreement also recognizes that DCMs “should not be expected to use 
international standards as a basis for their [domestic] technical regulations or 
standards.”96  
Under these recognitions, DCMs may adopt technical standards with 
lower protection, which may open greater market access for developed 
countries. In addition, although the WTO mechanism does not penalize lower 
protection standards that do not constitute barriers to trade, DCMs’ lower 
domestic standards harm their export capabilities in practice. For instance, 
lower standard products made in DCMs may not be able to meet higher 
technical requirements in developed countries, thereby preventing their export. 
In order to lessen the harm caused by this lower standard export limitation, 
corporations located in DCMs may still have to adopt international technical 
standards issued by international standardizing bodies. On the other hand, 
developed countries may not adopt higher technical standards with greater 
protection comparing with international technical standards, which may 
                                                 
91  Id. 
92  TBT, supra note 10, art. 14. 
93  Id. annex 2, art. 2. 
94  Nicholas A. Ashford, Letter to the Editor: “Trade Policy”, ISSUES SCI. TECH., Winter 2014, at 14–
16; Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, Private Standards and the WTO: Reclusive No More, 16 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 1, 5 (2017).  
95  TBT, supra note 10, arts. 12.1–12.3. 
96  Id. art. 12.4. 
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constitute barriers to trade. As such, the scope of technical measures of both 
developed and developing countries would lead to greater uniformity by the 
central role of international standards and bodies. 
Similar to “equivalent regulations,” the TBT Agreement offers “mutual 
recognition” to allow Members to accept different conformity assessment 
procedures from their own, “provided that they are satisfied those procedures 
offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or 
standards equivalent to their own procedures.”97 This mutually satisfactory 
understanding, however, shall be based on prior consultations regarding the 
“technical competence” of assessment bodies in exporting Members, which 
require verified compliance with “relevant guides or recommendations issued 
by international standardizing bodies.”98 In other words, although the TBT 
Agreement accepts different assessment procedures, these procedures are still 
governed by the guidance of international standardization bodies. Thus, 
alternate assessment procedures are also directed by the same group of experts 
at the same organizations. 
D. Greater Uniformity and Centralization Under the SPS 
Agreement 
Concerning international food safety and animal and plant health, the 
WTO passed the SPS Agreement on January 1, 1995.99  This Agreement 
provides administrative rules for Members’ domestic sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which cover “all relevant laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements and procedures” including “end product criteria; 
processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and 
approval procedures; quarantine treatments . . . and packaging and labelling 
requirements directly related to food safety.”100 
 Similar to the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement emphasizes that 
Members have the right to set their own standards.101 Members should not be 
prevented from “adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, 
                                                 
97  Id. art. 6.1. 
98  Id.  
99  WTO, WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES: SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 27–44 (1995) 
[hereinafter SPS MEASURES], https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries4_sps_e.pdf 
(containing introductory explanations and the body of the legal text).  
100  Id. 37. 
101  Id. pmbl. at 9, art. 2.1. 
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animal or plant life or health.” 102  However, domestic SPS measures, 
especially those that introduce a higher level of protection, are subject to 
certain “harmonized” and centralized conditions.103  
In the words of the SPS Agreement, domestic SPS measures shall be 
“based on the relevant international standards, guidelines[,] or 
recommendations,” 104  “scientific principles with sufficient scientific 
evidence,”105 and “applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.” 106  In particular, those SPS measures 
conforming to international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
(ISGRs) “shall be deemed to be necessary.”107 
In addition, those relevant ISGRs shall be recognized by “relevant 
international organizations” (RIOs), which explicitly refer to the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission relating to food safety;108 the International Office 
of Epizootics relating to animal health and zoonoses;109 and the Secretariat 
and regional organizations operating within the framework of International 
Plant Protection Convention regarding plant health. 110  If matters are not 
covered by these RIOs, appropriate standards, guidelines and 
recommendations may be promulgated by other RIOs identified by the WTO 
Committee on the SPS (the SPS Committee).111  
Other than the international and appropriate standards provided, 
recognized, or identified by relevant RIOs or the SPS Committee, the SPS 
Agreement accepts “equivalent” standards. 112  To the SPS Committee, 
“equivalence” does not require “duplication and sameness” of measures, but 
focuses on an importing Member’s “appropriate level of protection.”113 As a 
basic principle, Members’ adopted levels are presumed to be appropriate.114 
                                                 
102  Id. art. 2.1. 
103  Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 64, at 139.  
104  SPS MEASURES, supra note 99, arts. 3.1, 3.3.  
105  Id. art. 2.2. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. art. 3.2. 
108  Id. annex A, ¶ 3(a). 
109  Id. annex A, ¶ 3(b). 
110  Id. art. 3.4, annex A, ¶¶ 2–3. 
111  Id. annex A, ¶ 3(d). 
112  Id. art. 4.  
113  Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO Doc. G/SPS/19 (Oct. 24, 
2001). 
114  See SPS MEAURES, supra note 99, art. 4. 
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However, whether a protection level is considered consistent with the WTO 
law is mainly subject to risk assessment.115 
Under the SPS Agreement, “risk assessment” is defined as an 
evaluation of the likelihood of potential harm or damage, such as the spread 
of diseases, biological and economic consequences, or the adverse effects on 
animal and human health, that is associated with SPS measures in importing 
countries.116 This evaluation, in particular, must take into account available 
and relevant scientific and environmental evidence, as well as economic 
factors. 117  Moreover, the “likelihood” and “potential” or “probability” of 
harm is primarily based on qualitative methodologies.118  
This risk assessment that determines the appropriateness of Member 
adopted levels of protection also depends on RIOs.119 Article 5.1 SPS requires 
that domestic SPS measures to be based on appropriate assessments of the 
risks to human, animal, or plant life or health by “taking into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations.”120 In other words, Members’ appropriate levels of protection 
shall be based on appropriate risk assessment, which shall be based on the 
techniques developed by the same international organizations.  
Other than sufficient scientific evidence based on RIOs, domestic SPS 
measures may be provisionally adopted “on the basis of available pertinent 
information” from the RIOs and SPS measures adopted by other Members, 
but it is subject to “the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review” within a reasonable period. 121  Similar to 
appropriate levels of protection, although Members may adopt the same SPS 
                                                 
115  See id. art. 5.1, annex A, ¶ 4; Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 64, at 149; Jeffrey Atik, 
On the Efficiency of Health Measures and the ‘Appropriate Level of Protection’, in RES. HANDBOOK ON 
ENV’T, HEALTH & WTO 14, 116, 129 (Geert V. Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2014). 
116  SPS MEASURES, supra note 99, annex A, ¶ 4.  
117  Id. arts. 5.2–5.3. 
118  WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES – ARTICLE V 
(JURISPRUDENCE), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/sps_03_e.htm#annAA4. 
119  SPS MEASURES, supra note 99, art. 5.1; Alexia Herwig, Health Risks, Experts and Decision Making 
Within the SPS Agreement and the Codex Alimentarius, in THE ROLE OF ‘EXPERTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN DECISION MAKING PROCESSES: ADVISORS, DECISION MAKERS OR IRRELEVANT ACTORS? 195 
(Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2014). 
120  SPS MEASURES, supra note 99, arts. 5.2–5.3. 
121  Id. art. 5.7. 
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measures as other Members, these measures are still subject to “objective risk 
assessment” that is based on the techniques developed by RIOs.  
Moreover, if a Member has “reason to believe” that a domestic SPS 
measure “is constraining, or has the potential to constrain, its exports,” the 
regulated Member may request an explanation of the reasons that shall be 
provided by the regulating Member.122 Likewise, whether an explanation is 
reasonable is very likely to be determined by the WTO, which relies on 
scientific and technical experts who can be related to the same recognized 
international organizations.123  
As Article 11.2 of the SPS suggests, WTO panels should seek advice 
from experts chosen by the panel and the parties.124 In addition, the panel may 
“establish an advisory technical experts group” or consult the RIOs.125 As 
such, the RIOs and related experts may set “international standards, guidelines, 
recommendations” that are deemed necessary, determine whether domestic 
SPS measures are “based on” such standards, whether the protection levels of 
such measures are equivalent or appropriate, and whether explanations 
regarding SPS measures are reasonable.126 Under this scientific approach, 
international SPS measures can be, or are encouraged to be, uniform and 
centralized by several recognized international organizations and experts.127  
This uniformity and centralization also extends to the domestic level. 
Similar to the TBT Agreement, Members are required to support the SPS 
Agreement by formulating and implementing “positive measures and 
mechanisms.” 128  Central governments must take reasonable measures to 
ensure the compliance of regional bodies and non-governmental entities.129 
Hence, domestic SPS measures shall be harmonized, towards greater 
uniformity, with a more centralized framework. 
                                                 
122  Id. art. 5.8; Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures 
as Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes: EC – Hormones, Australia – Salmon and Japan – Varietals, 2 J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 641, 661 (1999). 
123  Herwig, supra note 119, at 194–95; Pauwelyn, supra note 122, at 661.  
124  SPS MEASURES, supra note 99, art. 11.2.  
125  Id. 
126  Herwig, supra note 119, at 194–95. 
127  Ryan D. Thomas, Where’s the Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS Agreement, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 491, 517 (1999); Pluralism in Practice, supra note 11, at 135; Halabi, supra note 6, at 
407. 
128  SPS MEAURES, supra note 99, art. 13. 
129  Id. 
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This harmonization also covers the least developed or developing 
country Members (DCMs). The SPS Agreement requires Members to provide 
technical assistance, and the SPS Committte may grant DCMs “longer time-
frames for compliance” and “time-limited exceptions.” DCMs, however, shall 
still adopt the SPS measures issued by RIOs. 130  Considering the SPS 
Committee functions to keep “close contact” with RIOs and to further 
international harmonization,131 those provisions of technical assistance and 
time exceptions for DCMs can also be a centralized means of creating greater 
uniformity. 
To briefly summarize, domestic measures shall be uniform and 
governed by the WTO and central authorities. The GATT begins with the 
“uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” for rule application, focusing on 
administrative conduct and procedures. Then, the China Protocol covers 
“uniform administration,” which extends to substantive trade measures. When 
food and product safety is concerned, the TBT and SPS Agreements further 
transform substantive international voluntary standards into domestic 
mandatory regulations. In light of the WTO law, Chinese food and product 
safety rules, therefore, can be expected to be uniform under a centralized 
framework. 
III. CHINA’S DECENTRALIZED FLEXIBILITY  
In contrast to the WTO’s uniformity and centralization, the Chinese 
food and product safety system relies on decentralization and flexibility, 
which may not be as transparent and unified as the WTO expects. Although 
China adopts the one-party “democratic dictatorship” that requires politically 
unifying views and thoughts, 132  the Chinese regulatory system has 
decentralized standards and administrative structures. This system can be 
viewed as self-regulatory, but also laissez-faire, which has led to rapid 
economic growth, but also severe abuses. Take, for instance, a 2007 incident 
where nearly a million toys that China exported to the United States were 
recalled when the United States discovered lead paint had been used, or the 
                                                 
130  Id. arts. 9.1–9.2, 10.1–10.3. 
131  Id. arts. 12.3–12.4; Thomas, supra note 127, at 491–92, 517; Halabi, supra note 6, at 407–08. 
132  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng an (中华人民共和国宪法修正案) [Amendment to 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 29, 1993, 
effective Mar. 29, 1993), CLI.1.6183(EN) (Lawinfochina) (adding amendments 3–11); Yong shi jiu da jing 
shen tong yi si xiang tong yi xing (用十九大精神统一思想统一行动) [Using the Spirit of the 19th CPC 
National Congress to Unify Thought], CPC PEOPLE (Oct. 26, 2017), 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/19th/n1/2017/1026/c414305-29610301.html. 
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melamine dairy crisis, which killed six infants and caused 300,000 people in 
China to fall ill.133 
A. Decentralized Standards 
Chinese food and product standards are governed by the 
Standardization Law, which was enacted in 1988 and came into effect in 
1989. 134  Under this statute, technical standards pertain to quality, testing 
methods, technical terms, and the process of producing industrial and 
agricultural products, environment protection, and construction projects.135 
In light of the Standardization Law, the state is required to “encourage 
the active adoption of international standards” 136  and to unify technical 
requirements.137 This unified administration, however, is governed by various 
departments at different levels: (1) Standardization Administration (SA) and 
“competent administrative authorities” (CAAs) under the State Council at the 
national level; 138  (2) the SAs of provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities (PAMs) directly under the central government, and CAAs 
under those departments of PAMs; and (3) the SAs and the CAAs at the city 
and county levels.139 Since the statute does not define the term CAAs, the 
governing power is, therefore, fragmented by both identified and unidentified 
administrations, departments, and authorities at different levels in terms of 
vertical administrative structure and horizontal geographical regions. 
In addition, these identified and unidentified administrations, 
authorities, and sectors may formulate their own standards. Under the 
Standardization Law, there are four types of standards: (1) National standards, 
which shall be unified nationwide and formulated by the SA under the State 
Council; (2) Trade standards, which are formulated by CAAs, in the absence 
                                                 
133  Louise Story, Lead Paint Prompts Mattel to Recall 967,000 Toys,  N.Y. TIMES: BUS. DAY (Aug. 2, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/business/02toy.html; China Dairy Products Found Tainted 
With Melamine, BBC (July 9, 2010), https://www.bbc.com/news/10565838. 
134  Biaozhunhua fa (标准化法) [Standardization Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1988, effective Apr. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Standardization Law], CLI.1.4165(EN) 
(Lawinfochina).  
135  Id. arts. 2(1)–(5); China Considers Draft Law Revision to Standardization Law, XINHUA (Apr. 24, 
2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/24/content_29062072.htm. 
136  Standardization Law, supra note 134, art. 4. 
137  Id. art. 2. 
138  The Standardization Law does not define “competent administrative authorities,” thus this term may 
refer to any authorities under the State Council at the national level. 
139  Standardization Law, supra note 134, art. 5. 
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of national standards; (3) Local standards, which are formulated by SAs of 
PAMs and shall be “unified within a PAM directly under the Central 
government,” in the absence of national and trade standards; and (4) Industrial 
standards, which shall be formulated by enterprises for the products they 
manufacture, in the absence of both national and trade standards.140 As such, 
different standards can be formulated by officials at different departments and 
levels, as well as corporations of different sectors. 
Following the Standardization Law, the Product Quality Law (PQL) 
was enacted in 1993 and amended in 2000.141 The PQL requires the state to 
encourage “enterprises to make their product quality reach and surpass their 
respective [sectorial] standards, national standards and international 
standards.”142 Moreover, industries may establish their own standards through 
government approval based on a voluntary principle. 143  In other words, 
enterprises do not have legal obligations to adopt international standards.144  
Hence, although international standards are encouraged at the central 
level, agencies, local administrations, and enterprises may formulate their 
own standards, especially when the upper levels are silent.145 This structure 
simultaneously encourages national unification and centralization, but also 
allows varied standards in different regions and sectors. Centralizing and 
unifying standards refers to the national standards that must be applied in the 
entire country. Varied standards, however, may fill in the gap and can be 
encouraged to reach or surpass the standards at upper levels. The food and 
                                                 
140  Id. art. 6. The term “industrial standards” is also translated as “enterprise standards” or “sector 
standards.” 
141  Chanpin zhiliangfa (产品质量法) [Product Quality Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 22, 1993, effective Sept. 1, 1993; amended July 8, 2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000), 
CLI.1.29404(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
142  Id. art. 6. 
143  Id. art. 14. 
144  Id. (although the PQL also requires the state to establish a certifying system based on international 
standards, this requirement may not be implemented due to many instances such as conflicts with the policy 
of non-interference and the contractual safety principle); Tang, China v. China, supra note 2, at 230, ch. 5 
(Political Dictatorship Versus Laissez-Faire Administration: Law As Written Action). 
145  Standardization Law, supra note 141, art. 6.  
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product standards applied in China, therefore, may not be as unified and 
centralized as WTO law expects.146 
B. Decentralized Administrations 
Unlike the uniform and centralized administration envisioned by WTO 
law, Chinese food and product safety is administered by a large number of 
disparate governmental institutions. For instance, under the Food Safety Law 
(FSL), which was enacted in 2009 and amended in 2015, national food 
standards shall be administered by different agencies, such as: (1) the health 
administrative department; (2) standardization authorities; (3) health and 
agricultural authorities; and (4) “competent authorities” under the State 
Council. 147  At the local level, the food safety shall be administered by 
“departments for health, agriculture, quality supervision, industry and 
commerce[,] and the FDAs [Food and Drug Administrations] at the county 
level or above.”148  Since China has more than 2,800 governments at the 
county-level and each county has their own agencies, the Chinese food safety 
administration is fragmented and decentralized to more than 10 thousand 
central and local departments at the different levels and regions.149  
Under the Chinese vertical administrative hierarchy, local 
administrations are governed, directly or indirectly, by upper level 
administrations. 150  However, in accordance with the Law on Legislation, 
enacted in 2000 and amended in 2015, local governments have open 
rulemaking power to formulate their own rules and regulations that can differ 
                                                 
146  TBT, supra note 10, annex 3, ¶ F (under the TBT Agreement, Members’ standardizing bodies only 
oblige to use international standards “as a basis for the standards it develops,” where “international standards 
exist or their completion is imminent”); SPS MEASURES, supra note 99, annex 96, art. 3, ¶ F. (under the SPS 
Agreement, “Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on interenational standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, where they exist . . . .”).  
147  Shipin anquan fa (食品安全法) [Food Safety Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective June 1, 2009; amended Apr. 24, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015) art. 
21 [hereinafter FSL], CLI.1.247403(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
148  Id. art. 31. 
149  These agencies’ duties and administrative scopes can be overlapped and conflict with each others.  
Improving Quality of China’s Products, GOV.CN (Apr. 14, 2015), 
http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/04/14/content_281475088749550.htm (besides the 
central and local agencies, China also has an undisclosed numbers of non-governmental institutions, such as 
trade and industrial associations, that may issue industrial standards).  
150  Tang, China v. China, supra note 2, ch. 3 (Centralization Versus Open Rulemaking Power). 
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from the law at the central level.151  These local measures, moreover, are 
mainly interpreted by local lawmakers,152 as Chinese judges do not interpret 
law—as common law judges would—but instead apply law as interpreted by 
lawmakers.153 As such, even if local trade measures are published in a timely 
manner under the WTO’s transparency principle, it might not necessarily 
mean that those measures would be implemented or applied in the same way 
or in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.”  
Under the WTO Agreements, the central government is obliged to 
ensure the compliance of local institutions. This obligation raises another 
consistent challenge regarding the information gap between the central and 
local governments in China. In light of the hierarchical administrative system, 
local administrations are responsible for reporting and seeking instruction 
from the central government.154 In practice, in order to secure their positions, 
local officials may not be willing to expose the shortcomings and mistakes 
they encounter. 155  The central authority, moreover, often does not have 
sufficient resources with an effective management system for gathering 
updated information regarding actual local circumstances.156  
One way for the central administration to receive local information is 
through petitions. 157  The Chinese petition system creates a direct 
communication channel between national citizens and the central 
                                                 
151  Id. ch. 2 (this rulemaking power is subject to certain principles, such as based on “actual needs,” 
“specific administration,” and “local affairs”); Laney Zhang, China: Law on Legislation Amended, LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, (July 8, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-law-on-legislation-
amended/.  
152  Tang, China v. China, supra note 2, at 126.  
153  Fa guan fa (法官法) [Judges Law] (promulgated by Order No. 38 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China on Feb. 28, 1995, effective Feb. 28, 1995, amended on June 30, 2001), CLI.1.35754(EN) 
(Lawinfochina) (under the Chinese legal system, judges shall “perform their functions and duties according 
to law,” but not make law). 
154  Lifa fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (adopted by the third Session of the Ninth Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 87, CLI.1.26942(EN) (Lawinfochina); Tang, China v. 
China, supra note 2, at 127. 
155  Poor food safety performance of provincial officials can lead to disqualification of awards and 
honorary titles which affect their promotions and evaluations in the administrative system. See China to 
Grade Provincial Governments’ Food Safety Performance, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-08/30/content_26640404.htm. 
156  Guanyuan taishang jiang lixiang taixia fubai (官員台上講理想台下腐敗) [Officials Speak of 
Idealism on Stage Corrupt in Action], H.K. ECON J. (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.hkej.com/template/ 
dailynews/jsp/detail.jsp?dnews_id=3651&title_id=582923. 
157  The term “petitions” is also translated as “letters and visits.” State Bureau for Letters and Visits, 
WWW.GOV.CN (Sep. 12, 2014), http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/01/ 
content_281474991089774.htm. 
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government.158 However, due to the numerous cases and limited resources, 
this system requires filing at the local level before filing with Beijing.159 As 
such, even if a central petition system exists, the central government often 
relies on local administrations to investigate and provide resolutions. This 
centralized petition system, therefore, is also based on a decentralized setting, 
which often leads to local retaliation against petitioners.160 
In 2013, the State Bureau for Letters and Visits (SBLV) at Beijing 
created a national network to accept online petitions directly from local 
citizens. The aim is to establish a centralized and “unified data interface 
standard” to collect complaints and share information with provincial 
officials.161 This centralized and unified setting, however, can be corrupted. 
Recently, two leading officials and their subordinates at the SBLV were found 
to have been bribed by local officials to remove complaint files that showed 
their wrongdoings. 162  Under the current performance evaluation system, 
officials are required to have low numbers of petitions.163 In order to secure 
their positions and avoid punishment, provincial officials who should assist 
petitioners often detain peititioners in “black jails,” force petitioners to leave 
Beijing, and “openly use funds to bribe” the central officials at SBLV.164 The 
effectiveness of this communication channel is, therefore, dubious. 
Another alternative way for receiving local information is through the 
media. However, the CPC Constitution requires unifying views of members, 
                                                 
158  Id. 
159  Guowuyuan xinfang tiaoli (国务院信访条例 ) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits] 
(promulgated by the State Council, May 1, 2005, effective May 1, 2005), CLI.2.56635(EN) (Lawinfochina); 
Loretta Chao, Beijing Moves to End Tradition of Petitions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125090460008351021.html.   
160  Xujun Gao & Jie Long, On the Petition System in China, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 34, 46 (2015).  
161  Xinhua, China to Build National Online Petitioning System, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 11, 2014),  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/11/content_17428952.htm.  
162  Guo jia xin fang ju wo an: shou bai ming di fang xin fang gan bu hui kuan yin man shang fang bu 
bao (国家信访局窝案：收百名地方信访干部贿款 隐瞒上访不报) [Cases Harbouring at the State Bureau 
of Letters and Calls: Receiving Bribes from A Hundred of Local Officials, Hiding Petitions Without Reports], 
GUANCHA, (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.guancha.cn/FaZhi/2017_04_10_402798.shtml. 
163  Corruption at Top Rung of China’s Ancient Petition System Sparks Calls for Reform, SCMP, (Apr. 
11, 2017,), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2086741/corruption-top-rung-chinas-
ancient-petition-system; An Bajie, New Regulation to Improve How Govt Handles Petitions, CHINA DAILY 
(Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201404/25/content_17463507.htm. 
164  Id. 
 
January 2019 Greater Uniformity and Centralization   91 
 
 
and the Party considers censorship a core policy.165 President Xi Jinping, in 
particular, requires all news media “to strictly follow the Party’s leadership 
and focus on ‘positive reporting.’”166 In 2017, a centralized online verification 
team was also set up to analyze “online rumors.”167 Informal food safety 
reports can be viewed to be “harmful information” that induce severe 
punishment.168  Shortcomings and non-compliance of administrations can be 
“sensitive matters” that should not be discussed.169 The transparency at the 
local level, therefore, can be distant from what WTO law requires.  
C. Flexible Standards Under Private Law 
Besides decentralized standards and administrative settings, Chinese 
export product safety is primarily based on the agreed-upon standards 
between foreign buyers and local sellers, notwithstanding the existence of 
international, national, trade, local, or industrial standards. This contractual 
safety standard requirement is established in the Standardization Law. 170 
Article 16 provides, “Technical requirements for export products shall comply 
with agreements contained in the contracts.” 171  As such, export product 
standards are based on contracts related to private law, which can be 
differentiated from domestic or international standards relying on 
administrative supervision related to public law.172 
The Chinese contract-based private law approach is also a flexible 
approach. Contractual parties bear the principal responsibility for food and 
product safety. Standards adopted may vary depending on buyers in different 
                                                 
165 Xinhua, Full Text Of Resolution On Amendment To CPC Constitution, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2017), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/24/content_33656521_3.htm; 
China’s Xi Underscores CPC’s Leadership in News Reporting, XINHUA (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/19/c_135114305.htm; Yu Hua, Censorship’s Many Faces, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/opinion/yu-censorships-manyfaces.html. 
166  Xi’s Speech Sparked Reflection, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
china/2017-02/21/content_28279094.htm. 
167  Cao Yin, Most Fake Postings Relate to Health, Food, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 20, 2017), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/20/content_29005038.htm. 
168  Id.; China to Boost Development of Online Media, CHINA DAILY (May 7, 2017), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-05/07/content_29238613.htm. 
169  See He Weifang, Rule of Law in China: Prospects and Challenges, BROOKINGS (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/11/28-china-law (Some scholars argue that China applies a 
“destroying from the beginning” strategy, which means that no “sensitive discussion” should be commenced 
and developed. In the view of the Party, words are like fire, and this expressive fire should be destroyed 
before it spreads).  
170  Standardization Law, supra note 134, art. 16.  
171  Id. 
172  Id. art. 4. 
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countries and circumstances. For instance, buyers for the American market 
are assumed to require products that satisfy the U.S. safety standard; buyers 
for the European market are assumed to require products that satisfy the E.U. 
safety standards; and the same for foreign buyers from Japan, Africa, Latin 
America, and others.173 Chinese export product standards, therefore, can be 
open and negotiable. 
Another reason for the adoption of contractual standards under private 
law is prices. Varied standards involve varied costs. Materials, workmanship, 
and production processes have different grades based on value, and each 
market and buyer has different budgets and requirements. These budgets and 
requirements control the safety standards applied. Particularly when most 
manufacturers in China are original equipment manufacturers that do not have 
their own brands and designs, the quality applied relies on buyers’ budgets 
and instructions.174  
This flexible approach is also linked with the market policy.175 Since 
the open-door policy was adopted in 1979, Deng Xiaoping emphasized a 
market-oriented economic system that is shifting from planning to open 
economic settings.176 Contractual parties, such as manufacturers in China and 
foreign importers, can be comparatively free to negotiate and determine prices 
and the safety standards involved. This freedom comes from the belief that 
the market is able to adjust safety standards in a way that benefits not only 
both parties, but society as a whole. Substandard products can be screened out 
                                                 
173  This approach assumes that satisfying the safety standards for each export markets is in the best 
interest of foreign buyers and Chinese manufacturers. 
174  This reliance also explains why Chinese manufacturers often ask for buyers’ samples and budgets 
before negotiation and confirmation of orders. These samples provided indicate the level of quality standard 
and cost structure. A problem in the quality differences between samples and final products often is due to 
price negotiation. In the view of some Chinese manufacturers, although the production sample has a higher 
quality, the quality level of the finished product can be adjusted by the low price agreed to by the parties. For 
example, in the book Poorly Made in China, a buyer successfully bargained to the low price he asked for. 
The price was so low that both the buyer and the author could not figure out how such a price was possible. 
This deal turned out to be a disaster, since the product quality was much lower than what the buyer expected. 
PAUL MIDLER, POORLY MADE IN CHINA: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE TACTICS BEHIND CHINA’S 
PRODUCTION GAME 16–25 (2009).  
175  The market policy is endorsed by both the Constitution of the PRC and the Party. For instance, the 
PRC Constitution views developing “the socialist market economy” as a main task of the modernization 
process. At the same time, the CPC Constitution emphasizes that the Party must implement the economic 
reform, opening up, and improving the “socialist market economy.” XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (China). 
176  This policy can be interpreted by Deng’s statement, “crossing the river by feeling the stones,” a shift 
from a planning to open approach, which can be risky, uncertain, and subject to change. 
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from the market through competition; only good quality products accepted by 
the market survive.  
This open and flexible approach is, moreover, based on the reality and 
feasibility that Chinese officials may not have better product and safety 
knowledge than private industries or foreign investors. In non-private sectors, 
such as state-owned enterprises, Chinese administrative agencies may not 
intervene because these businesses are governed and controlled by 
government officials already. This Chinese private law approach with little 
administrative supervision, therefore, is a laissez-faire one177 contrasting with 
the WTO’s public law approach, which expects administrative supervision 
directing more significant uniformity with centralized settings.  
D. Reliance on Ex Post Remedies 
The differences between China’s private law and WTO’s public law 
approaches have led to different administrative roles when it comes to the 
timing of the application of laws and extent of control. WTO law tends to 
focus on an ex ante preventive approach relying on administrative supervision 
before incidents occur. China, however, tends to adopt an ex post 
responsibility approach to self-regulation relying on administrative and legal 
responsibilities after product safety incidents. 
The Chinese ex post responsibility approach emphasizes remedies. 
These remedies can be administrative, criminal, civil, and others. For instance, 
in the Mattel case concerning toxic lead paint toys in 2007, the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) promised to “investigate and take tough measures,” 
and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (GAQSIQ) banned exports from suspect toymakers after the 
incident.178 
Although recall systems and new regulations were introduced, these 
new requirements still focus on the responsibilities and remedies after the fact, 
such as requiring manufacturers to terminate production and sales, notify 
vendors and customers, and report to authorities when safety incidents 
                                                 
177  Tang, China v. China, supra note 2, ch. 5 (Political Dictatorship Versus Laissez-Faire 
Administration: Law As Written Action). 
178  Bernice Chan, Investigation Aims to Ensure Toy Safety, CHINA DAILY  (Aug. 17, 2007), 
language.chinadaily.com.cn/2007-08/17/content_6031901. 
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occur.179  Producers are subject to fines and are responsible for taking all 
necessary measures, for instance, to replace, refund, and mitigate damages.180 
A similar approach is also emphasized in the new amendment of the FSL 
adopted in 2015 by increasing civil, criminal, and administrative penalties.181   
This “ex post remedies” approach also links with the self-regulatory 
approach related to the Chinese tradition. 182  Instead of relying on 
administrative supervision, manufacturers themselves are responsible for 
taking preventive actions. For instance, in the Mattel case, although there were 
Chinese national standard limits for lead levels in toys, Chinese regulators 
very likely did not conduct the inspection and instead relied on self-regulation 
of manufacturers. 183  Thus, in practice, factories may use the paint they 
want.184 Only after millions of foreign recalls, did the MOFCOM promise that 
“toy producers’ self-regulatory mechanisms will . . . be improved to ensure 
quality.” 185  The GAQSIQ also stated that the agency will “train the 
manufacturers to raise their self-discipline.”186  
This self-regulatory approach is also laid down by food and product 
safety laws. For instance, the FSL explicitly requires food producers and 
distributors to “ensure food safety, be credible and self-disciplined”187 and 
“establish a self-inspection system . . . on a regular basis,”188  as well as food 
industry associations to “strengthen industry self-discipline”189 and consumers’ 
“awareness of . . . self-protection.”190  
                                                 
179  Xinhua, China Unveils Recall Systems for Unsafe Food, Toys, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 31, 2007), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/31/content_6072181.htm.  
180  Id. 
181  China Serves Up New Food Safety Penalties, NPC (June 24, 2014),  
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2014-06/24/content_1868145.htm; State Council Rolls 
Out Rules on Regulating Food Safety, WWW.GOV.CN (May 11, 2016), 
http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2016/05/11/content_281475346788726.htm. 
182  Self-regulation, in particular, is related to original Confucianism. Tang, China v. China, supra note 
2, ch. 2 (Written Versus Unwritten Rules). 
183  David Barboza, Why Lead in Toy Paint? It’s Cheaper, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/11/business/worldbusiness/11lead.html.  
184  Id. 
185  Chan, supra note 178. 
186  Id. 
187  FSL, supra note 147, art. 4. 
188  Id. art. 47. 
189  Id. art. 9. 
190  Id. art. 10. 
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Under this self-regulatory approach, producers are, therefore, primarily 
responsible for preventing and eliminating unsafe food and toys.191 Quality 
inspections by provincial agencies should be conducted only when it is 
necessary.192 In the words of Chinese official media, “when necessary, the 
quality watchdog [GAQSIQ] at and above the provincial levels should 
supervise,” and “the government took all measures after the safety of China-
made products became a major concern.”193  
This self-regulatory approach, moreover, is generally adopted by the 
Chinese administration. For instance, in 2016 the MOFCOM announced plans 
to optimize “the self-discipline mechanism” in the catering industry.194 Also, 
in the Work Report of the Government (2016), Premier of the State Council 
Li Keqiang required officials “to be strict with oneself in practicing self-
cultivation, using power, and exercising self-discipline.”195 Thus, in contrast 
with the WTO’s preventive approach that relies on external administrative 
supervision, China’s preventive approach is at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, relying on internal self-regulation reinforced with ex post 
sanctions.196  
In summary, considering the decentralized flexibility embraced by the 
Chinese food and product safety’s regulatory system, this section discussed 
the standardization and administrative measures that can be formulated, 
administered, and interpreted by more than ten thousand identified and 
unidentified authorities at the central and local levels. Moreover, due to the 
ineffective management system and the control of media, the central 
government may not be notified of the actual circumstances.  
                                                 
191  Xinhua, China Unveils Recall Systems for Unsafe Food, Toys, supra note 179. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
194  Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Commerce on March 2, 2016, MOFCOM (Mar. 4, 
2016), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201603/20160301272238.shtml. 
195  Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government (2016), WWW.NPC.GOV.cn  (Mar. 18, 2016), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Speeches/2016-03/18/content1985677.htm (This self-regulatory 
approach is shown in different terms, such as “self-policing,” self-inspection,” “self-auditing,” among others, 
which rely on corporations to ensure their products are safe.); China Food Law: Year in Review 2016 – Out 
with the Monkey, In with the Rooster: A Look Back and a Look Ahead on China’s Food Safety System, KH 
LAW  (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.khlaw.com/China-Food-Law-Year-in-Review-2016; CFDA To 
Strengthen Regulation on Overseas Pharmaceutical Products, The Market Pattern to Change, CPHI  (Mar. 
21, 2016), https://www.cphi.com/china/visit/news-and-updates/cfda-strengthen-regulation-overseas-
pharmaceutical-products-market-pattern. 
196  Tang, The WTO’s Impact on China, supra note 48 (discussing the differences between internal and 
external regulatory settings).  
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The standards adopted for export products can be varied and based on 
contracts agreed to by foreign buyers and Chinese enterprises. Instead of the 
WTO’s preventive approach that emphasizes administrative supervision to 
prevent harm, China’s approach embraces private law and highlights self-
regulation and ex post remedies. Thus, the Chinese regulatory system, while 
rightly assumed to be highly centralized and anthoritarian, is, in many aspects, 
a laissez-faire one based on decentralization and flexibility in practice. While 
this flexibility may have caused rapid economic growth, it has also enabled 
food and product safety crises. 
IV. CHINA’S UNIFORMITY AND CENTRALIZATION DEVELOPMENT  
After joining the WTO and becoming subject to its laws, and with 
consideration for the importance of the food and product safety issue, the 
Chinese administration has begun instituting the international approach by 
requiring greater administrative supervision regarding centralization and 
uniformity. This centralized and uniform development is visible in statutes 
and regulations, as well as the governing structure. 
This section examines this development trend towards (1) higher 
centralization concerning the roles of experts, agencies, and the State Council; 
(2) uniform and unified information regarding food safety issues; (3) 
uniformity by imposing collective responsibility on third parties, as “related 
entities,” to require a higher level of peer surveillance; and (4) more uniform 
standards adopted voluntarily to increase competitiveness. 
A. Greater Centralization of Administrative Control 
Although the FSL laid down a decentralized administrative structure, it 
required a system with greater centralization than existed at the time. 197 
Following the WTO law, this centralized development underscores 
administrative control with the international terms such as “risk,” “prevention,” 
and “scientific supervision,” among others. For instance, Article 3 of the FSL 
requires that “food safety shall first be subject to prevention, risk management, 
                                                 
197  FSL, supra note 147, art. 56 (requiring that “local governments at and above county level shall take 
overall responsibility for lead, organize and coordinate the supervision and management of food safety in 
their jurisdiction,” and “define the responsibilities of the administrative departments for health, agriculture, 
quality supervision, industry and commerce and FDA for supervision and management of food safety”).  
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and full process control . . . to establish a set of scientific and stringent 
supervision and administration system.”198 
In line with the “full process control” and scientific directions above, 
the FSL requires the Chinese food safety supervision to be centralized at the 
State Council. 199  The central government “shall govern the Food Safety 
Committee,” 200  which consists of fifty-one experts 201  and functions to 
coordinate, integrate, supervise, organize, manage, and promote the food 
safety system involving the implementation of different departments at the 
central and local levels.202 Additionally, the FSL establishes other committees 
consisting of experts and representatives from “relevant departments” under 
the central government. 203  These committees include the National Expert 
Committee Food Safety Risk Assessment of forty-two members, which 
carries out risk assessments;204 and the National Food Safety Standard Review 
Committee, which formulates national food safety standards.205 As such, the 
food safety administration shall be supervised and monitored by those experts 
under the central authority.  
In addition, the FSL clarifies the duties of different departments under 
the State Council to enhance supervision with a more centralized 
framework. 206  These agencies include the China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA) that shall “supervise . . . food production and 
distribution”;207 the National Health and Family Planning Commission that 
                                                 
198  Id. art. 3. 
199  Id. art. 5. 
200  Id. art. 4. 
201  Shan Juan, Branch Established for Food Safety Risk Communication, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/21/content_17451611.htm. 
202  Feng, Chaozhuo (冯超卓), Guan yu guo wu yuan shi pin an quan wei yuan hui ban gong shi ji gou 
she zhi di tong zhi (关于国务院食品安全委员会办公室机构设置的通知) [State Council Food Safety 
Committee Administrative Structure and Setting], SCOPSR (Dec. 6, 2017), 
http://scopsr.gov.cn/bbyw/qwfb/201306/t20130619_226675.html. 
203  FSL, supra note 147, art. 29. 
204  Id. art. 17; see also Guo jia shi pin an quan feng xian ping gu zhuan jia wei yuan hui jian jie (国家
食品安全风险评估专家委员会简介 ) [Introduction of State Food Safety Risk Assessment Expert 
Committee], CFSA (CHINA NATIONAL CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT), 
http://www.cfsa.net.cn/Article/Singel.aspx?channelcode=2A9E075016B733825769FBA04017804BB9AC
0726D523E5B9&code=53C3DF92DF3DDF3E556C44268F65BDDEE4718189A36613B6 (last visited Dec. 
1, 2018). 
205  FSL, supra note 147, art. 23. 
206  Andrew Sim & Yilan Yang, China: An Overview of the New Food Safety Law, FOOD SAFETY MAG. 
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/enewsletter/china-an-overview-of-the-new-food-
safety-law/.  
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shall “organize the risk-monitoring and assessment,” “formulate and issue 
national food safety standards” with the CFDA, 208  and “formulate and 
implement national risk monitoring plans” with the CFDA and GAQSIQ;209 
the Standardization Administration of China that shall “provide national 
standard information”;210 and the Ministry of Agriculture that shall “exchange 
risk monitoring information about the safety of food and Edible Agricultural 
Products.”211 The Chinese food safety system, therefore, is centralized by the 
State Council by products and functions.   
The FSL also requires “centralized manner” and “centralized markets” 
at the local level. Centralized manner, in particular, refers to “full-process 
supervision and administration” that “shall lead, organize, and coordinate” to 
“establish and improve the working and information-sharing mechanisms” at 
different local regions.212 In light of this full-process supervisory order,  local 
administrations shall “encourage and support” small food workshops and 
vendors “to . . . operate in fixed locations such as centralized markets or shops 
. . . during a specified . . . period.”213 These requirements, thus, lead to greater 
centralization at the local level as well. 
Since 2009, regulations have been adopted regarding import and export 
of toys, food, seafood, meat, and other products. An example is the Measures 
for the Inspection, Supervision and Administration of Import and Export of 
Toys (MIET), formulated by the GAQSIQ. 214  Under this measure, the 
GAQSIQ supervises and administers toy exporters, toy enterprises involving 
high-risk materials, as well as toy laboratories and recall systems.215 Under 
the MIET, declaration statements from exporters are required to ensure that 
the exported toys comply with the standards of importing countries.216 Similar 
department regulations regarding import and export of seafood, meat, and 
                                                 
208  Id.  
209  Id. art. 14. 
210  Id. art. 21.  
211  Id. art. 20. 
212  Id. art. 6. 
213  Id. art. 36. 
214  Jinchukou wanju jianyan jiandu guanli banfa (进出口玩具检验监督管理办法) [Measures for the 
Inspection, Supervision and Administration of Import and Export Toys] [hereinafter MIET] (promulgated by 
the GAQSIQ, Mar. 2, 2009, effective Sept. 15, 2009), CLI.4.269953(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
215  Id. arts. 23–26. 
216  Id. art. 12. 
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other food were also formulated in 2011.217 These regulations emphasize the 
role of agencies under public law, instead of merely relying on contracts under 
private law.218  
 In line with this public law’s approach, the numbers of manufacturers 
can be controlled and directed by agencies. For instance, in order to “restore 
customer confidence and fend off foreign competition,” the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology may reduce small domestic 
manufacturers and nurture a few large Chinese dairy entities.219 Agencies may 
also help large entities to increase market share, such as setting a goal to 
achieve seventy percent in five years, to “seize control of the market and scoop 
up smaller players.” 220  In light of this safety development, food and 
merchandise production may be centralized in fewer enterprises, which can 
be controlled and supervised by governments.  
B. Uniform and Unified Information 
With respect to centralized information required by the TBT and SPS 
Agreements, China has established WTO/TBT and WTO/SPS National 
Enquiry Points (NEPs) located in the GAQSIQ.221 These NEPs provide a 
website, named WTO/TBT–SPS Notification and Enquiry of China, 
www.tbtsps.com, which functions to answer enquiries regarding related 
measures. 222  These NEPs allow the Chinese administration, associations, 
enterprises, and individuals to communicate with WTO Members. 223 
                                                 
217  These regulations include: (1) Jinchukou shuichan chanpin jianyan jianyi jiandu guanli banfa (进出
口水产品检验检疫监督管理办法 ) [Measures for Supervision and Administration of Inspection and 
Quarantine of Imported and Exported Aquatic Products] [hereinafter MIEAP] (promulgated by GAQSIQ, 
Oct. 18, 2002, effective Dec. 10, 2002), CLI.4.144566(EN) (Lawinfochina); and (2) Jinchukou roulei chanpin 
jianyan jianyi jiandu guanli banfa (进出口肉类产品检验检疫监督管理办法) [Measures for the Supervision 
and Administration of the Inspection and Quarantine of Imported and Exported Meat Products] [hereinafter 
MIEMP] (promulgated by GAQSIQ, Mar. 10, 2010, effective June 1, 2011), CLI.4.144567 (Lawinfochina). 
Exported product qualities must satisfy the standards of destination countries. MIEAP, art. 24. The 
administrative supervision shall be in line with risk assessment and management. Id. art. 45. 
218  MIEAP, supra note 217, art. 23. 
219  He Wei, Dairy Product Imports ‘To Witness Sharp Rise’, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-03/05/content_17324891.htm. 
220  Id. 
221  Mission, AQSIQ, http://english.aqsiq.gov.cn/AboutAQSIQ/Mission/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
222  WTO/TBT Zhong xin jie shao (WTO/TBT 中心介绍) [Introduction of WTO/TBT Center], GASQIS, 
http://www.tbt-sps.gov.cn/page/cwto/aboutus.action (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
223  Id. 
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Although the aim is to increase transparency regarding trade measures, this 
development centralizes and unifies information at the national level. 
In addition, the FSL explicitly obliges “unified manner,” “unified 
planning,” “unified information,” and “unified publication.” 224  Unlike the 
“uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” mandates in the WTO law, this 
unification does not mention impartiality and reasonableness. Moreover, 
“unified manner” shall be determined by the State Council, which applies to 
catering service, cafeteria management, and the publication of food safety 
information.225  
The FSL also requires the State, the central government, to “establish a 
unified information platform . . . and implement the unified publication 
system of food safety information.”226 The “unified information” concerned, 
in particular, involves “the national overall food safety, risk warning . . . major 
food incidents and their investigation and handling, as well as other 
information.”227 Thus, no such information may be published without the 
State Council’s authorization.228  
What local departments, such as food and drug, quality supervision, and 
agricultural administrations, may publish is mainly their routine supervision 
and administrative matters. 229  The FSL prohibits any organization or 
individual to “fabricate or disseminate false food safety information.”230 In 
other words, until information is verified and authorized by the central 
government, food safety issues may not be discussed, disclosed, or distributed 
by local governments, organizations, and individuals. As such, food safety 
information can be unified at both the local and central levels, under the 
control of agencies and the Party. 
C. Greater Uniformity by Collective Responsibility 
While WTO law emphasizes the preventive approach based on public 
administrative regulations, China imposes collective responsibility on third 
parties, as “related entities,” to establish a preventive system based on social 
                                                 
224  FSL, supra note 147, arts. 36, 56–57, 118–19. 
225  Id.; FSL, supra note 147, arts. 56–57, 118. 
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surveillance.231  Under the FSL, those potentially culpable entities include 
“anyone who provides production or distribution premises or other conditions 
for those engaging in the illegal acts.”232 In cases where consumers’ rights and 
interests are damaged, these related entities, such as property owners, “shall, 
together with producers and distributors . . . be held jointly and severally 
liable.”233 The FSL, moreover, does not require these related entities to know 
the illegal acts in question and does not define the term “other conditions.”234 
As such, the boundary of related “third-party providers” may be extended to 
ingredient and other suppliers, for instance, who may merely provide salt to 
unsafe food producers. These suppliers can be held strictly and collectively 
liable for the illegal acts committed by others.  
Some related entities, such as consolidated trading market operators, 
stall leasers, trade fair organizers, and online platform providers for food trade, 
have explicitly imposed food safety responsibilities.235 These responsibilities 
include reviewing food distributors’ licenses, specifying their management 
responsibilities, and regularly inspecting their distribution environment and 
conditions. 236  The online platform providers are specifically required to 
implement real-name registration, as well as to stop illegal activities and 
report to the food and drug administration at the county level.237 
Collective responsibilities were firstly formulated in local regions, such 
as Chongqing, in 2011. 238 By Chongqing’s local rules, related entities can be 
industries, regions, distributors, and products that “relate” to food safety 
incidents.239 Industrial collective responsibility can be imposed on a whole 
supply chain including ingredient suppliers, producers, distributors, retailers, 
                                                 
231  Some scholars, however, believe that this collective responsibility system is imported from the 
United States and Japan. See Zheng Fengtian (郑风田), Shipin anquan yingxiang Meiri xuexi “lianzuozhi” 
(食品安全应向美日学习”连坐制”) [Food Safety “Collective Responsibilities” Learning from the US and 
Japan], OPINION CHINA (Apr. 2, 2011), http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_1_13901.html. 
232  FSL, supra note 147, art. 122. 
233  Id. 
234  Id. arts. 122, 130–31. 
235  Id. arts 61–62. 
236  Id. 
237  Id. art 62.  
238  Chongqingshi zhiliang jishu jianduju shipin shengchanjiagong huanjie shipin shengchan jiagong 
weifa xingwei lianzuozhi zanxing guiding (重庆市质量技术监督局食品生产加工环节食品生产加工违法
行为连坐制暂行规定) [Chongqing City Quality & Technology Supervision Bureau Food Production Illegal 
Process Collective Responsibility Temporary Order] (promulgated by the Chongqing City Quality & Tech. 
Supervision Bureau, effective Dec. 1, 2011), CQZJGOV (Apr. 27, 2012), 
http://www.cqzj.gov.cn/Page/content.aspx?newsid=46443.  
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users, and services providers who knowingly supply storage, transportation, 
or other facilities.240 Similar to the FSL, “related entities” are not necessarily 
those that have committed violations. Merely having a connection to safety 
incidents or violators may sufficiently lead to regulatory responsibilities and 
sanctions.  
By official reports, collective responsibility aims to promote self-
regulation and self-governance. 241  Through the joint liability imposed on 
related entities, the collective responsibility approach establishes a peer-
surveillance mechanism with the aim to monitor and direct the food industry 
to self-regulate their production. Some also consider collective responsibility 
as promoting “collective governance.” 242  Instead of solely relying on 
administrations, food safety is governed by related sectors outside the food 
industry. 243  This collective responsibility system, therefore, may also be 
viewed as a preventive approach based on peer-surveillance to ensure 
compliance and pursue uniformity.  
D. More Uniform Standards 
Under the market economy and WTO law, increasing uniform 
standards can be a competitive strategy in attracting foreign investment and 
enhancing economic growth. The unifying development for international, 
national, local, and private standards can be established through voluntary 
measures, joint-ventured enterprises, and other commercial activities.  
With respect to voluntary standards, 5,575 Chinese food enterprises 
obtained International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certificates in 
2011, which accounts for almost a third of the total number awarded in that 
                                                 
240  Chongqing tuichu shengchan jiagong huanjie shipin anquan “lianzuozhi” (重庆推出生产加工环
节食品安全”连坐制) [Chongqing Launches Food Safety Collective Responsibility System], XINHUA  (Dec. 
16, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2011-12/06/c_111221383.htm. 
241  Chongqing tui shipin anquan lianzuozhi woerma biaoshi jiang tonggai qianfei (重庆推食品安全
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Walmart Promised to Correction], CHINA DAILY  (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/zxqxb/2011-10-14/content_4059501.html. 
242  “Shi shang zui yan” sha an fa 10 yue 1 ri qi shi shi , shou du ti chu “shou fu ze ren zhi” mai dao 
wen ti shi pin, ke rang chao shi xian pei chang (“史上最严” 食安法 10月 1日起实施, 首度提出 “首负责
任制” 买到问题食品，可让超市先赔偿) [“The Strictest in the History” Implementing FSL from Oct. 1, 
Initiating “First Responsibility” Purchasing Questionable Food Products, Compensating by Grocery Stores 
First], SHFDA (SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION)  (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.shfda.gov.cn/gb/node2/yjj/xwzx/mtbd/u1ai45316.html. 
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year.244 Some reports show that China has the most ISO 9001 certificates of 
management standard and ISO 14,001 certificates of environmental 
management standard.245  
In China, ISO certificates are issued by certification bodies that are 
accredited by the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity 
Assessment (CNAS).246 The CNAS was founded in 2006 as “the national 
accreditation body of China unitarily responsible for the accreditation bodies, 
laboratories[,] and inspection bodies.”247 Established and authorized by the 
Certification and Accreditation Administration, the mission of CNAS is to 
“establish and operate the national accreditation system for conformity 
assessment bodies.”248 As of April 2015, CNAS has created 135 certification 
bodies, which have rendered over 840,000 certificates.249  
Besides voluntary standards, different business models are established 
to achieve international standards. One example is a wholesale supply model 
to ensure food safety “from farm to fork” by METRO Cash & Carry China 
(METRO China).250 A store providing wholesale and retail services, METRO 
China assists farmers and food producers in improving production, processing, 
packaging, and logistics management to comply with varied international 
food safety standards such as the Global Good Agricultural Practice, 
International Featured Standards,251 ISO 22000 standards,252 and the Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Points system.253 This wholesale model helps to 
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increase the competitiveness of small and medium-sized retailers.254 Along 
with this process, international standards are being adopted through connected 
operation between farmers, processors, wholesalers, and retailers. This model 
seems to be growing in China.255  
In addition, there is a trend of importing not only foreign products but 
also corporations through joint ventures and integration. For instance, due to 
the melamine-tainted milk scandal and growing domestic demand, imported 
dairy products increased from 120,000 tons in 2008 to 600,000 tons in 2009, 
is estimated to reach 14.2 million metric tons in 2017, and expected to exceed 
19 million metric tons in 2026.256 To improve the quality, dairy companies set 
up their own farms instead of collecting raw milk from small farmers.257 
Moreover, joint venture enterprises were established with foreign dairy 
corporations from France, New Zealand, and Switzerland, among others.258 
As a result, international production and management standards were adopted 
to achieve greater uniformity.  
 Uniform standards can also be achieved by quality training conducted 
by foreign administrations and corporations. After the toy safety crisis, 
Chinese agencies sponsored training courses for manufacturers and regulators 
                                                 
254  Li Fusheng, supra note 250. A Trader Support Solutions program was launched in 2011 aiming to 
assist two million independent retailers that are facing intense competition. The support provided includes 
analyzing strengths, locating target customers, suggesting products, and supplying quality products at 
competitive prices. Statistics show that this support solution increases smaller retailers' sales by 40%. Id. 
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infant formula has accounted for nearly 90% of the domestic market); Wang Xiaodong, Report: Dairy 
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Suppliers, REUTERS  (June 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/china-dairy-
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http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-12/04/content_15983681.htm; Fonterra Invests $30m in 
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10/21/content_11440527.htm; Lu Chang, Milking It: Farmers Tap into Area’s Dairy Advantage as More 
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led by American and European experts, who are representatives from private 
sector companies, such as Mattel, as well as foreign administrations, such as 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (U.S. FDA).259 For instance, under 
the U.S. FDA – AQSIQ China, Agreement on the Safety of Food and Feed, 
the U.S. FDA may conduct inspections of covered food products in China 
without providing notice in advance.260 Chinese manufacturers, therefore, are 
not only subject to the unified supervision of the Chinese administration but 
also foreign authorities.  
Reviewing the food and product safety development, China is moving 
towards greater uniformity and centralization under the “full process control.” 
As discussed, this control involves strengthening the administrative and 
supervisory power of the central government, unifying information, imposing 
collective responsibility, as well as adopting more international standards 
voluntarily as a market strategy to increase competitiveness. This process, 
however, seems to be enhancing the economic power of the communist 
administration, and it is unclear if the food and product safety problem can be 
solved. 
Considering the administrative and supervisory power of the Chinese 
governance, food and product safety statutes require a more centralized 
framework within an internal system. 261  In the name of safety, the State 
Council supervises and monitors food and product production at both the 
central and local levels. The rules applied, moreover, are not bound by a rule 
of law framework that emphasizes external checks and balances, impartiality, 
and reasonableness.262 This greater administrative power to monitor economic 
activities, therefore, can also be a move backward, as it enhances the control 
of the Party.263  
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As stated, this internal regulatory framework does not have independent 
media of a public reporting system.264 Together with the “strictest” control of 
food safety, the central government shall supervise and determine the “unified 
manner,” “unified planning,” “unified information,” and “unified publication.” 
What the public is more likely to see are those reports providing unified 
positive views, such as showing: “96.8 percent of [food] samples met 
standards in 2015,” “fake baby formula met national safety standards,”265 and 
“authorities across China received 1.03 million reports regarding food and 
drug safety from the public” to announce the administration is working hard, 
and Chinese food and products are safe.266 People might not know whether 
these positive stories are true. A CFDA survey in 2015 showed that “nearly 
seventy-five percent of respondents did not have any or enough confidence in 
domestic food safety.”267 “Online rumors,” therefore, spread continuously.268 
In light of this internal system, the preventive approach relying on 
collective responsibility can also be ineffective, especially when wrongdoers 
can be related to governing administrations. For instance, Sanlu, the formula 
maker that caused the food safety crisis, was a state-owned enterprise 
governed by officials. 269  Under the market policy, Chinese officials are 
legislators, law interpreters, administrators, regulators, as well as business 
developers with the duty to achieve economic growth. 270  Significant 
enterprises, directly or indirectly, associate with governments or the Party.271 
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The Chinese preventive approach, therefore, still emphasizes self-regulation 
and self-governance, which is not subject to any independent or external 
scrutiny. 
This self-governing safety development, moreover, is not necessarily 
driven by mandatory regulations nor consistent with the WTO law. Although 
China has adopted more international standards, this improvement can be 
made voluntarily to attract foreign investment and to improve market access. 
Besides, those adopted standards may cover stricter standards required by  
private international corporations.272 Considering that the WTO law aims to 
avoid unnecessary trade barriers among Members, the “international 
standards” adopted by China’s enterprises can still be controlled by private 
corporations and supervised by the Party to secure their economic power.273  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the impact of the WTO law on China’s food and 
product safety development regarding uniformity and centralization. This 
study observes that although the WTO Agreements emphasize free trade to 
pursue non-discriminatory treatment and to eliminate trade barriers, the 
transparency and harmonization process can be used and directed to an 
opposite end: the enhancement of the economic power of the Party.     
Considering the transparency principle, the GATT highlights the 
“uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” of rule application, and the China 
Protocol underscores “uniform administration” regarding trade measures. 
When international food and product safety is involved, the TBT and SPS 
Agreements extend further to preempt and harmonize substantive regulations. 
In light of these agreements, a vertical governing structure with centralized 
settings has been established, and is expected to create greater uniformity. 
This uniformity and centralization, nevertheless, seems to be 
inconsistent with the Chinese regulatory system. This system has a highly 
decentralized, non-uniform structure depending on private law and ex post 
remedies. Without the rule of law framework, the new development mainly 
embraces a unified and centralized manner regarding information, and a 
preventive approach encouraging peer-surveillance. Although more 
international standards can be adopted voluntarily, this framework trusts and 
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promotes internal self-regulation. Media shall be controlled. Safety reports 
shall be positive. No one shall speak up without authorization. 
Thus, although the WTO law aims to encourage free trade and fair 
treatment to pursue greater consistency, predictability, and certainty of the 
rule of law, China’s embrace of the WTO can instead be used to consolidate 
their internal governance control. In association with international 
corporations, exported Chinese food and product safety may still be ensured 
by the assessments conducted by importing countries. Domestic Chinese food 
and product safety, however, must be overseen by the Party. This leader, the 
Party, has the “full process control” over political, economic, judicial, and 
administrative powers over thoughts and expression. A unifying voice from 
the central government and echoed by local administrations: Chinese food and 
products are safe.  
